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We use a new dataset on non-resource GDP to examine the performance of commodity-
exporting countries in terms of macroeconomic stability and economic growth in a panel of 
up to 129 countries during the period 1970-2007. Our main findings are threefold. First, we 
find that overall government spending in commodity-exporting countries has been 
procyclical. Second, we find that resource windfalls initially crowd out non-resource GDP 
which then increases as a result of the fiscal expansion. Third, we find that in the long run 
resource windfalls have negative effects on non-resource sector GDP growth. Yet, the effects 
turn out to be statistically insignificant when controlling for government spending. Both the 
effects of resource windfalls on macroeconomic stability and economic growth are moderated 
by the quality of political institutions. 
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The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily 
represent those of the IMF or the World Bank. All remaining errors are ours. 2 
1. Introduction 
Fluctuations in commodity prices pose serious challenges to developing countries. In the present 
paper, we focus  on the effects that  these price  fluctuations may have  on commodity-exporting 
countries. Indeed, the episodes of sharp increases in commodity prices since the early 2000s have 
renewed  the  debate  among  academics  and  policy  makers  on  the  risks  faced  by  commodity 
exporters. Figure 1 shows that the evolution of government spending tracks that of the index of 
commodity export price in Venezuela and the extent of the synchronization has been increasing 
during the 2000‟s commodity price boom. In contrast, Figure 2 shows that government spending 
appears to move exactly opposite compared to the index of commodity export price in Norway. 
This cursory look at the data seems to suggest that there may be some fundamental factors which 
may shape the commodity exporters‟ reaction to commodity price fluctuations. In this paper, we 
rigorously  examine  the  impact  of  resource  windfalls  on  macroeconomic  stability  and  long  run 
economic growth using panel data for a world sample of up to 134 countries during the period 
1970-2007.  
This paper makes two main contributions. First, the paper specifically focuses on the effect 
of resource windfalls on the non-resource sector. To do so, we use a new dataset on non-resource 
GDP allowing us to avoid the “noise” introduced by the resource sector contribution to the overall 
GDP.
1 Indeed, Hartwick (1977) provides a canonical rule for sustainability in resource dependent 
economies which can help consumption to be maintained indefinitely, even in the face of finite 
resources and fixed technology. The rule consists in setting genuine saving to zero at each point in 
time; this sets traditional net savings just equal to resource depletion. From that perspective, non-
resource  sector  GDP  should  thus  be  the  relevant  measure  to  be  used   when  assessing  both 
macroeconomic stability  and long run economic performance in commodity-exporting countries. 
                                                 
1   Section 2 describes the estimation of the non-resource GDP which takes into account the depletion of the stock of 
natural resources. 3 
From  a  policy  perspective,  preserving  the  macroeconomic  stability  of  the  non-resource  sector 
specifically  will  contribute  to  fostering  investments  in  that  sector  and  thus  will  contribute  to 
sustained economic growth after natural resources are depleted. Second, unlike in previous studies, 
the econometric investigation explicitly takes into account the role of fiscal policy (government 
spending more specifically) in the analysis of the so called “resource curse”.
2 Indeed, the resource 
sector often lacks direct structural linkages with the rest of the economy but exercises a significant 
externality mostly through the fact that a large  chunk of government spending is financed from 
revenues  originating  from the resource sector   (through  state ownership  or taxation or  export 
tariffs...). Identifying the  nature of that externality can help foster our understanding of both the 
short run dynamics of the  non-resource sector and its long run economic viability  after natural 
resources are depleted.  
Our  main  findings  are  threefold.  First,  we  find  that  overall  government  spending  in 
commodity-exporting  countries has been procyclical.  Second, we  find that resource windfalls 
initially crowd out  non-resource GDP which then increases as a result of the fiscal expansion. 
Third, we find that in the long  run resource windfalls have negative effects on the  non-resource 
sector GDP growth. Yet, the effects turn out to be s tatistically insignificant when controlling for 
government spending. Both effects of resource windfalls on macroeconomic stability and on growth 
are moderated by the quality of political institutions.    
This  paper  links  to the  literature on  the role of  fiscal policy in  shaping the economic 
performance of  developing countries.  There is ample evidence that  fiscal policy in  developing 
countries has achieved mixed results both in the short and long run . In the short run,  Kaminsky, 
Reinhart,  and  Vegh  (2004 ),  among  others,  provide  evidence  that  fiscal  policy  tends  to  be 
procyclical in developing countries especially when compared to industrialized countries.  Three 
                                                 
2    Gylfason (2001) and Sachs and Warner (1995) have provided early evidence of a significant negative correlation 
between natural resource abundance and economic growth. 4 
important characteristics of commodity-exporting countries complicate the conduct of fiscal policy 
and are likely to make government spending more procyclical than in non commodity-exporting 
countries. First, government revenues derived from the exploitation of natural resources are more 
volatile than other sources of government revenue. Second, the size of the revenues derived from 
natural resources is often disproportionately large in commodity-exporting countries. Third, those 
revenues are prone to rent-seeking behavior as they transit more directly to the government coffers. 
Cuddington  (1989)  provides  some  evidence  supporting  the  claim  that  fiscal  policy  is  more 
procyclical in commodity-exporting countries. In the long run, there is also mixed evidence that 
government spending has helped boost developing countries‟ economic performance (see Blejer 
and Khan (1984) and Khan (1996)). Gelb (1988) provides careful case studies that governments in 
those  commodity-exporting  countries  often  embark  on  large  investment  projects  following 
commodity price booms. He argues that those investment projects were plagued by inefficiencies 
and also contributed to resource misallocation. In addition, those disproportionally large investment 
projects get depreciated quickly or even become obsolete as governments are unable to cover the 
associated high maintenance costs due to lack of continued financing.  Torvik and Robinson (2005) 
provide a political economy model, where “white elephants” may be preferred to socially efficient 
projects when the political benefits are large compared to the economic surplus generated. This 
evidence  could  suggest  that  poor  long-run  economic  performance  in  commodity-exporting 
countries may stem from both inefficiencies in government spending rather than underinvestment. 
Further, this paper relates to the literature on the resource curse focusing specifically on the 
effects of resource endowment on the economic performance of commodity-exporting countries. 
This  literature  has  emphasized  several  channels  through  which  resource  windfalls  may  affect 
economic performance, including the so called “Dutch disease” and a deterioration of institutions, 5 
to  name  a  few  (see  Frankel  (2011),  for  a  survey).
3  Overall,  there  is  some  evidence ,  albeit 
controversial, that commodity-exporting countries‟ growth performance compares less favorably 
with the growth performance of non commodity-exporting countries. Among others, Alexeev and 
Conrad (2009) provide evidence supporting a more skeptical view of the resource curse. Using 
traditional cross-sectional growth regressions, they find, for instance, that the empirical association 
between  resource  dependence  and  economic  performance  is  not  robust  to  using  samples  with 
different starting years or to the inclusion of additional controls. In a recent attempt to reconcile 
these conflicting evidences regarding the existence of a resource curse, Collier and Goderis (2007) 
use panel cointegration techniques allowing them to disentangle the short and long run effects of 
resource windfalls on overall GDP growth. They find that commodity price shocks have a positive 
effect in the short run but a negative effect in the long run.  
This  paper  also  relates  to  the  literature  which  has  stressed  the  importance  of  political 
institutions in achieving better policy outcomes (see for example Persson, 2002). In their seminal 
contribution to the growth and institutions literature, Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) have shown that 
political institutions are key determinants for long-run economic development.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
presents  the  estimation  strategy  and  main  results.  Section  4  discusses  a  number  of  robustness 




                                                 
3   This paper departs from the traditional Dutch disease literature distinguishing between tradable and non tradable 
sectors. Instead, we focus here on the distinction between the resource and non-resource sector.  6 
2. Data 
2.1. Non-resource GDP (NRGDP) 
Non-resource GDP is approximated by subtracting the real values of natural resources rents 
from total GDP in 2005 PPP adjusted USD (see Hamilton and Ruta (2008), for more details on 
resource rents computation).
4 Natural resources give rise to rents because they are not produced; in 
contrast, for produced goods and services competitive forces will expand su pply until economic 
profits are driven to zero. An economic rent represents an excess return to a given factor of 
production. For each type of resource and each country, unit resource rents are  thereby derived by 
taking the difference between world prices  (to reflect the social opportunity cost of resource 
extraction) and the average unit extraction or harvest costs (including a “normal” return on capital). 
Unit rents are then multiplied by the physical quantity extracted or harvested to arrive at total rent.
5  
2.2. Resource Windfalls 
To capture revenue windfalls from international commodity price booms, we construct a 
country-specific  and  plausibly  exogenous  index.  The  index  consists  of  a  geometric  average  of 
international prices of various commodities using (time-invariant) weights based on the average 
value  of  exports  of  each  commodity  in  the  GDP  for  a  given  country.  Annual  international 
commodity price data are for the 1970-2007 period from UNCTAD Commodity Statistics, while 
data on the value of commodity exports is from the NBER-United Nations Trade Database. Because 
the  time-series  behavior  of  many  international  commodity  prices  is  highly  persistent,  resource 
windfall shocks are identified by the (log) change in the international commodity price.
6  
                                                 
4   The resource rents data are from World Bank (2011). The GDP data are from Heston et al. (2009). 
5   The energy resources include oil, natural gas and coal, while metals and minerals include bauxite, copper, gold, iron 
ore, lead, nickel, phosphate, silver, tin, and zinc. 
6    The commodities included in the commodity export price index are aluminum, beef, coffee, cocoa, copper, cotton, 
gold, iron, maize, oil, rice, rubber, sugar, tea, tobacco, wheat, and wood. In case there were multiple prices listed for 
the same commodity a simple arithmetic price average was used. 7 
 2.3. Political Institutions: Democracy 
Democracy is measured by the revised combined Polity score (Polity2) of the Polity IV 
database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). The classification uses a 10-point scale that categorizes four 
attributes of political systems: the competitiveness of political participation, the competitiveness of 
executive  recruitment,  the  openness  of  executive  recruitment,  and  the  constraints  on  the  chief 
executive. At one end of the scale, +10, are the most politically competitive and open democracies. 
At the other, –10, are the least open and competitive autocracies. Following Persson and Tabellini 
(2003, 2006) and the Polity IV project, we classify countries as deep democracies, if their Polity2 
score is larger than or equal to 6, and as deep autocracies, if their Polity2 score is smaller than or 
equal to -6. 
3. Estimation Strategy and Main Results 
3.1. Preliminary Analysis 
Table 1 provides basic summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis; 
namely,  the  resource  windfall  index,  NRGDP  growth  (in  level  and  per  capita),  government 
spending, government‟s share in NRGDP (government size), real effective exchange rate (REER), 
and Polity 2.
7 
In the following, we further explore whether  the series used in the empirical analysis a re 
stationary in level or in first difference. Table 2 presents the results of three different panel unit root 
tests. The tests proposed by Levin, Lin and  Chu (2002) (LLC) and Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) (IPS) 
use as null hypothesis that all the cross -units contain a unit root. We also use the Hadri (2000) 
Lagrange multiplier test which uses as null hypothesis that all the cross -units are stationary. The 
                                                 
7    Government spending is measured by the ratio of government expenditures to non-resource GDP. Government 
expenditure data is from Heston et al. (2009). The real exchange rate data is obtained from IMF(2010a), while the 
current account data is obtained from IMF(2010b).   8 
tests provide conflicting results which suggest that we cannot rule out that some of the key variables 
indeed contain unit root. When considering the logarithm of NRGDP in level, LLC indicates that 
we should reject the null of all cross-units containing a unit root while IPS test indicate that we fail 
to reject the same null hypothesis. The Hadri test rejects the null hypothesis of stationarity of all 
cross-units. When taking the first difference in the logarithm of NRGDP, LLC and IPS now both 
reject that the null of all cross-units contain unit roots, while Hadri still indicates that we should 
reject  the  null  of  all  cross-units  contain  stationary  series.
8  Similar results are obtained when 
considering the logarithm of NRGDP in per capita. The various panel unit root tests performed on 
our resource windfall index, government spending, and REER deliver conflicting messages in level 
suggesting some evidence that those variables contain non stationary series. When taking the first 
difference of those variables, we now have evidence of stationarity. We further test for the presence 
of cointegration between these variables using the four tests developed by Westerlund (2007) and 
Persyn and Westerlund (2008). The results of the various panel cointegration tests are presented in 
Table 3. They  clearly fail to reject the null of  no cointegration for various combination of the 
variables used in the following empirical analysis. Both the evidence of non  difference-stationarity 
and the absence of cointegration between the variables used in our empirical analysis suggest that 
we should use the variables in differences in our empirical analysis.
9  
3.2. Macroeconomic Stability 
We  now  turn  to  the  empirical  investigation  of  the  experience  of  commodity-exporting 
countries with macroeconomic stability. To do so, we use panel Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) 
techniques.  The  use  of  panel  VAR  techniques  makes  it  possible  to  isolate  the  dynamics  of  a 
                                                 
8    According to Hlouskova and Wagner (2006), the Hadri test tends to over-reject the null hypothesis and thus may 
yield results that directly contradict those obtained using alternative test statistics.  
9    Indeed, using those variables in level would lead to spurious results because of the lack of cointegration relationship 




statistical  relationship  and  the  interdependencies  between  multiple  economic  variables;  namely, 
resource windfalls, which assumed to be exogenous, and two endogenous variables: non-resource 
GDP and government spending. Another advantage of panel VAR techniques is that they allow the 
simultaneous  estimation  of  all  relationships  while  taking  into  account  specific  country 
characteristics through the use of fixed effects. The method consists of a simultaneous IV-GMM 
estimation  of  series  of  equations.  Denoting  the  vector  of  endogenous  variables  by  zit  and  the 
resource windfall index by pit, our system of equations can be specified as follows: 
                                                 
                            
where fi is a set of time-invariant country fixed effects. Mean differencing, which is usually used in 
estimating panel data models, will create a bias in the estimates, since the fixed effects will be 
correlated with the independent variables due to the presence of a lagged dependent variable. As in 
Arellano and Bover (1995), we apply forward mean-differencing and use the lagged regressors as 
instruments in the estimation of the system.  
 The results of the estimations are presented in Table 4. The dynamic effects of the various 
shocks are illustrated by the impulse responses presented in Figure 3. Those results suggest that the 
average effect of an increase in resource windfalls is followed by a statistically and economically 
significant increase in government spending. Indeed, we find that an increase of resource windfall 
by one standard deviation leads at its peak to an increase in government spending by slightly less 
than  a  tenth  of  a  standard  deviation.  This  result  provides  supportive  evidence  that  on  average 
commodity-exporting  countries  have pursued procyclical  government  spending policy. Figure  3 
also  shows  that  resource  windfall  shocks  initially  crowd  out  non-resource  GDP  which  in  turn 
increases as a result of the fiscal expansion. An increase by one standard deviation in resource 10 
windfall leads on impact to a reduction by about one standard deviation in non-resource GDP and to 
an increase by half a standard deviation in the following period.  The intuition behind this result is 
that an increase in resource windfalls increases the return of investing in the resource sector leading 
in turn to a reallocation of factors  away from the non-resource sector in favor of the resource 
sector.
10 As government spending  increases in response to  an increase in government revenues 
following a resource windfall, the non-resource sector expands. The latter results provide empirical 
evidence of  a resource sector  externality onto the  non-resource sector  stemming from resource 
windfalls spurring government spending.  
When  expanding  the  empirical analysis  to the  real exchange rate and the  non-resource 
current account, we find that resource windfalls lead to an increase in the growth of real effective 
exchange rate and  to a  deterioration of the non-resource current account (results not reported in 
tables).
11  Those  results  are  consistent  with  the  so  called  “Dutch  disease”.  Indeed,  government 
spending directed toward the non tradable sector with and inelastic supply, leads to an increase in 
the relative price of non tradable compared to tradable goods. This increase leads to an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate with potentially harmful effects on external competitiveness consistent 
with a deterioration of the non-resource current account following a resource windfall shock. 
We now explore whether the quality of political institutions influences the way resource 
windfall shocks impact macroeconomic stability in commodity-exporting countries.  To do so, we 
split  the  sample  between  deep  autocracies  and  deep  democracies  and  run  our  panel  VAR 
regressions for each sub-sample separately. We find stronger evidence that government spending in 
autocracies increases following a resource windfall shock. Quantitatively, a one standard deviation 
shock  to  resource  windfall  leads,  at  its  peak,  to  an  about  one  standard  deviation  increase  in 
government  spending in deep autocracies (Figure 6). Those effects  are  much larger than when 
                                                 
10      This result holds when controlling for the changes in REER, as shown in Figure 4. 
11    The non-resource current account is constructed by subtracting commodity exports from overall current account. 11 
considering our overall sample. In deep democracies, we find evidence that government spending 
has been counter-cyclical. Indeed, we find that on impact an increase in one standard deviation in 
resource windfall index lead to a decrease by slightly less than a standard deviation in government 
spending (Figure 5). During the period following the shock, the effect of a resource windfall on 
government  spending  in  deep  democracies  becomes  positive  but  is  no  longer  statistically 
significant.  When comparing the effect on non-resource GDP following a resource windfall shock, 
we find that in both groups resource windfall shocks initially crowd out non-resource GDP which 
then increases following the fiscal expansion. However, we find that the evidence of a crowding out 
effect  is  quantitatively  smaller  in  deep  democracies  compared  to  deep  autocracies.  Indeed,  in 
autocracies a one standard deviation increase in the resource windfall index leads on impact to a 
decrease of about a third of a standard deviation in non-resource GDP in autocracies and to a 
decrease by tenth of a standard deviation in democracies. A large share of commodity windfalls 
accrues to government sector (through state ownership or taxation or export tariffs...). These results 
suggest  that  democracy,  through  promoting  accountability  and  consensus,  reduces  the  perverse 
effect  that  resource  windfalls  may  have  on  the  non-resource  sector.  Indeed,  more  accountable 
government may exercise less discretion in the conduct of fiscal policy in turn leading to less 
macroeconomic instability. That evidence is consistent with for instance Persson (2002) who has 
stressed the importance of political institutions in achieving better policy outcomes.  
3.3. Economic Growth 
The above-mentioned results suggest that commodity-exporting countries are, on average, 
subject to macroeconomic instability which in turn can lead to potential adverse effects on their 
long run economic performance. In addition, one of the key challenges that commodity-exporting 
countries face is the need to reduce their dependence on commodities by rebalancing their wealth 
from natural capital in favor of reproducible capital and social capital, including human capital. 12 
Figure 7 illustrates for instance that commodity-exporting countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Middle East have a disproportionately higher share (over 30 percent) of their total wealth as natural 
capital. However, a large increase in government spending risks yielding both poor technical and 
allocative  efficiencies.  To  take  stock  of  the  historical  experiences  of  commodity-exporting 
countries, we now systematically investigate the impact of government spending on long run non-
resource sector growth in the face of resource windfall shocks.  
To do so, we use the Pooled-Mean-Group (PMG) techniques developed by Pesaran and 
Smith  (1995),  Pesaran  (1997),  and  Pesaran,  Shin  and  Smith  (1999)  to  estimate  the  effects  of 
resource windfalls and government spending on non-resource GDP growth per capita. The use of 
panel cointegration techniques allows us to separate out the short run from the long run effects of 
government spending on non-resource GDP growth.  
The long-run growth regression equation is specified as an ARDL (p,q) process with an 
error-correction term as follows: 
             
     
                  
     
                             
      
                           (1) 
where, Y is the growth rate of real per capita non-resource GDP, and X is a set of exogenous 
variables; namely, our resource windfall index, the share of government spending in non-resource 
GDP, the initial level of income proxied by the lagged value of non-resource GDP per capita, the 
change in the logarithm of real exchange rate and the quality of political institutions. Disturbance 
term is denoted by ε.
 12 The estimations provide us with a set of short run coefficients γ and δ, a set 
of long run coefficients β, and a speed of adjustment coefficient φ. The pooled-mean-group 
                                                 
12    The specification also includes time and fixed effects. 13 
estimation by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999) imposes equality in long run coefficients but treats 
short run coefficients as heterogeneous.
13  
Table 5 presents the results of  the PMG estimations focusing on the long run coefficients. 
On average, we find that resource windfall shocks have statistically and economically significant 
negative effect on the long run non-resource sector GDP growth as shown in column (1). Indeed, 
we find that increase in our resource windfall by one standard deviation would lead to a reduction 
of long run economic growth by about a fifth of a standard deviation. We also find that on average, 
an increase in the share of government spending has a negative effect on long  run non-resource 
GDP growth, as shown in column (2) . Those two results are in line with the existing literature  
providing evidence that resource windfalls and larger governments  both lead to weaker long run 
economic growth. However, what is new is that resource windfalls stop having a negative effect on 
long run non-resource growth when controlling for government spending as shown in columns (3) 
to (5). This result suggests that government spending is an important vehicle of the resource curse 
hypothesis. In other words, the externality stemming from the resource sector to the  non-resource 
sector is  conveyed  through  government  spending  chiefly  financed  by  resource  sector related 
government revenues.  When  controlling for  the  change in the real exchange rate   as shown in 
column (4), resource windfall shocks have a positive effect on non-resource GDP growth. This 
result confirms that Dutch disease is a relevant channel of the resource curse. When controlling for 
the quality of  political institutions as shown in column (5) , the above results do not appear to 
change significantly. Given that the quality of  political institutions changes little over time, it is 
perhaps  hard to  meaningfully assess the individual effect of  democracy  on long run economic 
growth when exploiting within country variation over a few decades. 
                                                 
13    The results of a Hausman test support the validity of those imposed restrictions. 14 
In Table 6 we explore the potential heterogeneity in the effect of resource windfalls and 
government spending on non-resource GDP growth. We explore whether the quality of political 
institutions helps alleviate the resource curse by interacting both our resource windfall index and 
government spending with our measure of the quality of political institutions.  We find that the 
impact of resource windfalls and government spending are moderated by the quality of political 
institutions.  Everything  else  being  equal,  an  increase  in  Polity2  from  that  of  Gabon  to  that  of 
Norway would lead to a reduction in the effect of resource windfalls on non-resource GDP growth 
by half. While an improvement in the quality of political institutions could reduce the effect of 
resource  windfall  on  economic  growth,  we  find  that  even  with  the  highest  quality  of  political 
institutions, the effect of resource windfall on non-resource GDP remains negative as shown in 
columns (1) and (2). In columns (3) and (4), we also provide evidence that the quality of political 
institutions moderates the effect of government spending on long run non-resource GDP growth 
suggesting that the benefit of political institutions on economic growth are channeled through better 
fiscal policy. Indeed, as a large share of commodity windfalls accrues to government sector, more 
accountable governments can better support non-resource sector‟s long run economic performance 
by  reducing  government  spending  inefficiencies  and  resource  misallocation.  Those  results  are 
consistent  with  the  political  economy  literature  which  has  stressed  the  importance  of  political 
institutions in achieving better policy outcomes (see for example Persson, 2002) and Acemoglu et 
al.  (2001,  2002)  who  have  shown  that  political  institutions  are  key  determinants  for  long-run 
economic development.  
 4. Robustness Checks  
A relevant question is whether our results are driven by the quality of economic institutions 
rather than political institutions. Indeed, the indicator capturing the quality of political institutions 
displays  a  relatively  high  correlation  with  the  indicator  capturing  the  quality  of  economic 
institutions  namely  the  rule  of  law  indicator  (0.31).  Also,  Melhum  et  al.  (2006)  provide  some 15 
evidence that good economic institutions can alleviate the resource curse using standard cross-
sectional  growth  regression.  To  test  whether  economic  institutions  play  a  moderating  role  in 
shaping the effect of resource windfall on economic growth, we try interacting resource windfalls 
with various (or combination of) indicators capturing the quality of economic institutions including 
the rule of law or corruption indices from Political Risk Services (2009). Because the data on 
economic institution is available from 1985 onwards, we tried both using it as is, and solely using 
its average value in an interaction term with our resource windfall index. Irrespective of which 
economic institution indicator we use or of the way in which the indicator is used, we do not find 
any robust evidence that economic institutions moderate the effect of resource windfalls on non-
resource GDP growth. The results are indeed not robust across specifications, and those results are 
supportive of the “primacy” of political institutions over economic institutions as a tool to moderate 
the effect of resource windfalls on non-resource GDP growth. 
5. Summary 
This  paper  examined  the  performance  of  commodity-exporting  countries  in  terms  of 
macroeconomic stability and growth in a panel of up to 129 countries during the period 1970-2007. 
To do so, we used a new dataset on non-resource GDP. Our main findings are threefold. First, we 
find that on average government spending in commodity-exporting countries has been procyclical. 
Second, we find that resource windfalls initially crowd out non-resource GDP which then increases 
as a result of the fiscal expansion. Third, we find that in the long run resource windfalls have 
negative effects on non-resource sector GDP growth. Yet, the effects turn out to be statistically 
insignificant when controlling for government spending. Both the effects of resource windfalls on 
macroeconomic stability and economic growth are moderated by the quality of political institutions.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of Government Spending and Resource Windfalls in Venezuela  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Δ Resource Windfall Index  4823  0.000  0.006  -0.055  0.085 
Δ log NRGDP  4823  0.032  0.083  -1.108  0.774 
Δ log Government Spending  4823  0.035  0.144  -2.102  1.753 
Δ log NRGDP per Capita   3996  0.015  0.067  -0.691  0.553 
Initial log NRGDP per Capita  3888  8.542  1.134  5.735  11.446 
Government Share in NRGDP  4104  0.180  0.096  0.014  0.739 
Δ REER  2944  -0.016  0.263  -11.665  2.189 
Polity 2  3560  1.123  7.506  -10.000  10.000 
log(Polity2 +12)  3560  2.344  0.742  0.693  3.091 
Average log(Polity2 +12)  3610  2.350  0.578  0.693  3.091 
  Note: Pooled-Mean-Group estimations use the logarithm of Polity 2 score plus 12. 
.  
 
Table 2. Panel Unit Root Tests 




Years  Variable  trend  Stat
1  P-value  Stat
2  P-value  Stat
3  P-value 
NRGDP  yes  -6.93  0.00  10.24  1.00  119.26  0.00  129  38 
∆NRGDP 
 
-29.65  0.00  -34.26  0.00  4.90  0.00  129  37 
Resource Windfall Index 
 
-2.72  0.00  -1.89  0.03  36.65  0.00  108  38 
∆ Resource Windfall Index 
 
-32.49  0.00  -33.71  0.00  -2.41  0.99  108  38 
Government Size 
 
-2.94  0.00  -2.31  0.01  128.22  0.00  129  38 
∆ Government Size  Yes  -26.62  0.00  -39.48  0.00  -2.46  0.99  129  37 
ln(REER) 
 
-5.38  0.00  -4.19  0.23  112.10  0.00  129  28 
∆ ln(REER) 
 
-22.36  0.00  -26.09  0.00  -6.30  1.00  129  27 
Notes: All tests include an intercept. 
1 Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) (LLC) adjusted t-statistics 
             
2 Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) (IPS) z-tilde-bar statistics 
             
5 The Hadri (2000) LM test (Hadri) z-statistics 
               
 
Table 3. Panel Cointegration Tests 
 
Ga  Gt  Pa  Pt 
Variables  Z-value  p-value  Z-value  p-value  Z-value  p-value  Z-value  p-value 
 
Intercept 
y, G/NGDP, P  11.77  1.00  7.87  1.00  6.01  1.00  2.75  1.00 
y, G/NGDP, P, REER, NCA  15.08  1.00  12.94  1.00  11.48  1.00  9.07  1.00 
 
Trend and Intercept 
y, G/NGDP, P  2.87  1.00  6.35  1.00  0.21  0.58  1.80  0.96 
y, G/NGDP, P, REER, NCA  8.01  1.00  14.44  1.00  7.38  1.00  11.04  1.00 
Note: The Ga and Gt test statistics test H0: φ
i = 0 for all i versus H1: φ
i < 0 for at least one i. These statistics start from a weighted average of the 
individually estimated φ
is and their t-ratio's respectively. Rejection of H0 therefore implies the existence of a cointegration relationship for at least 
one of the cross-sectional units.  The Pa and Pt test statistics used the pooled information over all the cross-sectional units to test H0: φ
i = 0 for all i 
vs H1:  φ
i < 0 for all i. Rejection of H0 should therefore be taken as evidence of cointegration for the panel as a whole. The difference between Ga 
and Gt as well as between Pa and Pt is their asymptotic power. Ga and Pa are preferred to Gt and Pt when T is substantially greater than N. We 






Table 4. Panel VAR Estimation Results 
LHS Variable  RHS Variable  Coefficient  GMM S.E.  GMM t-stat 
∆ Resource Windfall Index 
       
 
∆ Resource Windfall Index  -0.012  0.026  -0.456 
∆ Government Spending 
       
 
∆ Resource Windfall Index  1.895  0.438  4.328 
 
∆ Government Spending  -0.148  0.046  -3.217 
 
∆ NRGDP  0.147  0.067  2.188 
∆ NRGDP 
       
 
∆ Resource Windfall Index  1.005  0.379  2.653 
 
∆ Government Spending  -0.009  0.015  -0.639 
 
∆ NRGDP  0.114  0.045  2.525 
Number of Countries 
 
108 
    Number of Observations 
 
4689 
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses including REER for All Countries  
 
 
Figure 5. Impulse Responses for Deep Democracies 
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Figure 7. Natural Capital Around The World  
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Table 5. Pooled-Mean-Group Estimation Results 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Long-Run Coefficients 
          Initial NRGDP  -0.089  -0.051  -0.074  -0.107  -0.061 
 
0.006  0.004  0.006  0.006  0.006 
∆ Resource Windfall Index  -1.082 
 




0.501  0.657  0.497 
Government share in NRGDP 
 
-0.049  -0.022  -0.081  -0.042 
   
0.018  0.020  0.022  0.017 
∆ REER 
     
0.018 
 
       
0.005 
  Polity II 
       
0.004 
         
0.002 
Error-Correction Coefficient 
          Phi  -0.820  -0.909  -0.805  -0.688  -0.838 
 
0.034  0.030  0.040  0.048  0.042 
Short-Run Coefficients 
          ∆ Growth (-1)  -0.036  0.021  -0.038  -0.073  -0.022 
 
0.023  0.020  0.026  0.038  0.028 
∆2 Resource Windfall Index  -0.426 
 




0.673  0.681  0.582 
∆ Government share in NRGDP 
 
-1.480  -1.451  -1.275  -1.415 
   
0.138  0.157  0.171  0.161 
∆
2 REER 
     
0.024 
 
       
0.014 
  ∆ Polity II 
       
-0.058 
         
0.015 
Intercept  -0.010  -0.006  -0.013  -0.019  -0.010 
 
0.010  0.005  0.008  0.011  0.007 
No. Of Countries  108  129  94  94  94 
No. of Observations  3564  4257  3102  2277  3094 
Note: The dependent variable is NRGDP per capita growth. The numbers in bold indicate statistical significance at 5% or more. The lag order for 
the ARDL was chosen using SBIC. Only coefficients associated with the first lags are presented in this table to conserve space. 
 
Table 6. Pooled-Mean-Group Estimation Results with Interactive Effects 
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Long-Run Coefficients 
        Initial NRGDP  -0.080  -0.062  -0.075  -0.041 
 
0.006  0.005  0.005  0.004 




0.597  0.497 
 
0.429 
Government share in NRGDP 
 
-0.030  -0.019  -0.061 
   
0.017  0.018  0.020 
Polity2   0.004  0.003  0.003  0.005 
 
0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
Polity2  x Windfall  0.072  0.160 
   
 
0.040  0.037 
    Polity2  x Gov. Size 
   
0.002  0.001 
     
0.001  0.000 
Error-Correction Coefficient 
        Phi  -0.798  -0.807  -0.874  -0.896 
 
0.038  0.043  0.042  0.040 
Short-Run Coefficients 
        ∆ Growth (-1)  -0.056  -0.035  -0.014  0.029 
 
0.030  0.030  0.027  0.020 




0.755  0.623 
 
0.551 
∆ Government share in NRGDP 
 
-1.342  -1.568  -1.520 
   
0.171  0.175  0.174 
∆ Polity2   -0.047  -0.062  -0.041  -0.035 
 
0.017  0.017  0.014  0.013 
∆ Polity2  x Windfall  -0.047  -0.059 
   
 
0.032  0.032 
    ∆ Polity2  x G-size 
   
0.000  0.000 
     
0.001  0.001 
Intercept  -0.006  -0.007  -0.009  -0.007 
 
0.009  0.007  0.009  0.005 
SC  4143.8  4149.1  4110.1  4271.0 
No. Of Countries  94  94  94  94 
No. of Observations  3290  3290  3290  3290 
Note: The dependent variable is NRGDP per capita growth. The numbers in bold indicate statistical significance at 5% or more. The lag order for 
the ARDL was chosen using SBIC. Only coefficients associated with the first lags are presented in this table to conserve space. 25 
 